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PERSPECTIVES ON STATE v. NAGEL:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT'S
DISCORDANT MEDLEY
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINES
Thomas M. Lockney*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court in
State v. Nagel' provides a good opportunity to assess current fourth
amendment search and seizure law as applied by the North Dakota
court. Local application of important fourth amendment principles
seldom receives the attention it deserves. I am happy, therefore, to
offer some comments on Nagel for comparison with the somewhat
different views of Bruce Quick,2 Assistant State's Attorney for Cass
County, the winning advocate in Nagel. Read together, we hope
that our contrasting perspectives might provoke further discussion
and examination of the North Dakota Supreme Court's current
approach to contemporary fourth amendment search and seizure
issues.
Nagel presents a factual situation equal to the imagination of
the most creative fourth amendment buff. Characteristically, the
case involves criminal charges against two individuals under the
controlled substances act.3 Monte Nagel was prosecuted for
*B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1967; J.D., University of Texas-Austin, 1970;
LL.M., Harvard 1974; Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of North Dakota. My
colleague at the University of North Dakota, Professor Marcia O'Kelly, and my friend, Michael
Schaeffer, Attorney at Law, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, read a rough draft of this comment and
made it, in my view, readable and coherent. Thus, they deserve my thanks.
1. 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981).
2. Quick, Reflections on State v. Nagel: TheState's Perspective, 58 N.D.L. REV. 745 (1982).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 19-03.1 (1981).
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possession of marijuana. 4 Nagel lived at the scene of the crime(s), a
home in Fargo, North Dakota, with his young friend, Gary. 5 Gary
was charged with delinquent acts of possession with intent to
deliver methamphetamines and possession of more than one ounce
of marijuana. 6 The drugs in question were suppressed as evidence
in both cases because they were obtained incident to illegal arrests.
The cases were consolidated on appeal.
The legality of the arrests and resulting searches and seizures
provides the grist for Mr. Quick's and my mill. Agent Kim
Murphy of the Attorney General's Drug Enforcement Unit made
one or two buys7 of methamphetamines from a man named Jay
Braaten. Agent Murphy arranged for another buy from Braaten on
November 21, 1979. While Murphy waited for Braaten, a team of
officers 8 followed Braaten to the home of Nagel and Gary. After
two hours in the home, Braaten left and met with Murphy between
3:30 and 4:00 p.m. During this meeting Braaten delivered one-half
pound of methamphetamines to Murphy in exchange for $10,200.
Braaten was arrested shortly thereafter. Braaten told Murphy that
Nagel and Gary expected him back within twenty minutes. Braaten
also stated that if he did not return within that time they would
know something had gone wrong. Braaten told Murphy about a
large cache of methamphetamines in an upstairs bedroom. He did
not know whether Nagel and Gary were armed.
Agent Murphy relayed the information from Braaten to the
surveillance team and went to obtain a search warrant. The
surveillance team quickly concluded that they had probable cause
to arrest Gary and Nagel for the commission of felonies and that
4. State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1981).
5. "Gary" is a pseudonym used by the court because he was ajuvenile. Id, at 540.
6. Id. at 541. For the statutes pertaining to the illegal possession, see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-
03.1-07, -23 (1981) (methamphetamines); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-05, -23 (1981) (marijuana).
7. See infra note 21 for a discussion of the confusion regarding the number of drug buys. Compare
Nagel, 308 N.W.2d at 540 (court's opinion indicating two buys) with Appellant's Appendix at 2,
Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539 (agent's affidavit in support of search warrant indicating one buy).
8. The size of the surveillance team is in some doubt. It apparently consisted of four to seven
officers. Agent Murphy's testimony at the suppression hearing revealed the names of six officers
present when he arrived with his warrant. Transcript on Appeal at 18. Another agent apparently
testified with Murphy when requesting the search warrant, but whether he was ever a part of the
surveillance team is a mystery. Id. at 24. However, the same officer (unless there were two Smiths
involved) was also said to have been present at the home when Murphy arrived with his warrant. Id.
at 18. On cross-examination, Murphy was asked questions about the "seven" other officers and
never disputed that number as being accurate. Id. at 25-26. Murphy also responded affirmatively to
a question from the bench that referred to seven officers. Id. at 38. He failed to dispute the number
seven with the court and also agreed with the court that the purpose of the seven officers in entering
and making the arrest was to detain the occupants until the search warrant could be obtained. Id. at
40, 42-43. The defendant Nagel indicated in his testimony that four officers initially entered to make
the arrest, but that three more then joined them. Id. at 47, 52. Of course, he would have no
knowledge about the size of the team surreptitiously surveilling him prior to the entry and arrest.
Since the burden is on the government to justify a warrantless entry and arrest, this comment
proceeds with the assumption that there were seven officers available on the scene.
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evidence would be destroyed before the warrant could be executed
if Braaten did not return within the twenty minutes. After the team
approached the door of the home, knocked, and announced who
they were and why they were there, an individual who had come to
the door fled. The officers broke down the door and entered.
According to the officers' testimony they then made only a
cursory search to check for other occupants. They placed Gary and
Nagel under arrest and seized a small quantity of marijuana that
was in plain view on a magazine stand in the living room.
According to police testimony, no further search occurred until
after Murphy returned with a warrant.9 The search under the
warrant, served by Murphy at 6:30 p.m., produced the bonanza: a
large bag of marijuana in the living room where Gary and Nagel
had waited with the surveillance team for Murphy's return, a large
amount of methamphetamines in Gary's bedroom, and small
amounts of marijuana apparently scattered about the house.
The district court granted Nagel's pretrial motion to suppress
the seized evidence. 10 The district court based its decision primarily
on Payton v. New York. I In Payton the United States Supreme Court
held that in the absence of exigent circumstances, police officers
need an arrest warrant to enter a person's home to make a felony
arrest. 12 First, the district court determined that Payton should be
applied retroactively because the relevant constitutional ruling was
made prior to Nagel and Gary's trial. Next, the court determined
that although Payton expressly reserved the question whether
warrantless entries can be justified by exigent circumstances,
guidelines on that issue laid down by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in State v. Page13 were not satisfied in this case. Thus, the
entry to arrest could not be justified without a warrant. Finally, the
district court held that the subsequent search under the warrant
9. The defendants told a quite different story. The Nagel court noted the defendants' version as
follows:
Gary and Monte testified that they were sitting on the couch in the living room when
the officers broke down the door without knocking and arrested them. . . The
defendants said the officers searched through the house although Monte testified at the
hearing on the motion to suppress that he could not see whether or not they searched
other rooms. The defendants also said that the officers found a bag of marijuana
behind a speaker in the living room where Monte and Gary were handcuffed and
seated on the couch.
308 N.W.2d at 540.
10. Id. at 541. In the juvenile proceeding against Gary, the district court originally denied his
motion to suppress the marijuana and methamphetamines. The juvenile court later granted Gary's
renewed motion to suppress, relying on the intervening opinion and suppression order in Nagel's
case. Id.
11. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
12. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
13. 277 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1979).
729
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
was rendered invalid by the prior illegal entry.
The structure of the North Dakota Supreme Court's opinion is
curious when contrasted with the district court's straightforward
progression from retroactivity to illegality to taint. 14 The North
Dakota Supreme Court first examined the justification for the entry
and arrest and discovered sufficient exigency. Despite that
determination, the court went on to hold that Payton need not be
applied retroactively to the Nagel case, thereby rendering the
discussion of the previous issue unnecessary.1 5 The holding that
Payton is not retroactive also rendered unnecessary the discussion of
additional issues, yet the court indicated that the evidence was
admissible in any event because it would have been inevitably
discovered by legal means. Finally, almost as an afterthought, the
court reached the most important issue and in one short,
conclusory paragraph determined that probable cause existed to
support issuance of the search warrant.
The court did not mention that essentially the same probable
cause that is necessary to justify the warrant must be the basis for
the prior entry and arrest. Thus, if probable cause did not exist,
neither the entry, the arrest, nor the search is supportable. This is
true regardless of the retroactivity of Payton, the existence of exigent
circumstances, or the use of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
It is, therefore, difficult to understand the logic of the
opinion's structure, which discusses belatedly and almost casually
the primary issue. But, recognizing with Holmes that "the life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience,' ' 6 it should be
noted that the problem is not merely one of style or semantics. The
lawyers and judges of the state deserve guidance in this important
and complicated area of the law. They should at least be able to
determine the holding of the case, however cursory or unclear the
reasoning. 17
14. On appeal the prosecution raised the same issues, but reversed the order of the second and
third issue. In the second issue the prosecution asked the court to assume the retroactivity of Payton
and to consider the issue of the connection between the illegal entry and the subsequent search.
Then, assuming the seizure was the fruit ofan unlawful entry and arrest, the third issue was whether
exigent circumstances existed tojustify the warrantless entry and arrest. Appellant's Brief at 2.
Although the structure of the issues may appear to be a minor detail, it does seem that the
district court had the better approach. If the entry and arrest were legal, either because of the
nonretroactivity of the Payton decision or because of the existence of exigent circumstances, then there
is no illegality to discuss in the context of the issues of"taint" and "fruit of the poisonous tree."
15. As the North Dakota Supreme Court recently observed, "the amendedJudicial Article does
not require us to discuss and give reasons for every point fairly arising from the record." State v.
Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 772 (N.D. 1982). The court has also followed a common sense principle
of judicial economy by repeatedly holding that any question not necessary to a decision of the case
need not be considered. E.g., Inches v. Butcher, 104 N.W.2d 556, 561 (N.D. 1960).
16. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
17. Consider the court's recent changes of position on the issue of strict liability in criminal law
in which major statements in one case, State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1980),
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In one sense, however, the structure of the opinion resembles a
masterful shell game because on each issue subsequent opinions
can say that a particular portion of Nagel was unnecessary to the
decision in the case. Thus, we cannot really know which portions of
the opinion may be mere dicta.
The remainder of this comment will focus on the reasoning
offered by the court as support for the possible specific holdings in
the opinion. It attempts to demonstrate how the court could have
based its result on any one of several dispositive issues without
playing its shell game in which the holding is never found.
Ii. PROBABLE CAUSE
The North Dakota Supreme Court concludes its opinion in
Nagel with a brief discussion of the defendants' claim that
insufficient probable cause existed to justify issuing the search
warrant. The court first recites a typical judicial litany of black
letter probable cause cliches: "depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case," "relates to factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men act,'18 "hearsay will support a finding of probable cause,"
"the informer must be found credible and information must be
revealed which shows that the basis of his information is
reliable." 1 9 Then with guidance from only cliches and string
citations, the court casually disposes of the heart of the case: was
Jay Braaten, drug merchant and chief informant against the
defendants in this case, a credible informant based upon
information known to Agent Murphy and presented to the
magistrate issuing the warrant? Indeed, the issue is more important
than the court admits. Although the issue is relevant to the validity
of the warrant, the issue also arises in the equally important context
of the initial entry and arrest. That is, the very information
necessary to validate the warrant must also be used to justify the
initial entry and arrest.
How does the court reason its way to probable cause? Its
analysis reads in its entirety as follows:
offered for the "purpose of determining where problems may exist in the statute" a year later were
labelled mere "dicta." State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301, 306 (N.D. 1981).
18. 308 N.W.2d at 547 (quoting State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D. 1979)).
19. 308 N.W.2d at 547, The Nagel court cited the fourth amendment classics as follows:
"Aguilar v. Texas, 386 U.S. 300 . . .(1967); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 . . .(1969);
McCray v. State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 . . .(1967); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) .
Id.
Obviously, something is amiss. Aguilar is cited twice, once incorrectly by repeating the McCray
citation. Perhaps this is a Freudian slip that recognizes the lack of attention about to be given to the
real Aguilar-Spinelli issue in Nagel. That lack of attention will be discussed next in this comment.
732 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
In this case the informant did not know that he was
selling drugs to an agent. He had done so twice before.
Surveillance confirmed his statements that he had been at
[Nagel] and Gary's shortly before his arrest. He had one-
half pound of methamphetamines and said he had seen
more in an upstairs bedroom. There was sufficient
information to find that the informant was reliable, as his
statements saying where he had been were confirmed by
the surveillance team and he had twice previously sold
drugs to agent Murphy as he had agreed to do. There was
probable cause to support the search warrant. 20
There may well be a variety of bases that support a finding that
Braaten's statements were credible.21 Merely saying he was
credible, however, does not make him so. 22 The conclusory analysis
of the court, taken at face value, suggests the disturbing possibility
that an informant is reliable if a surveillance team has seen him at
the place where he says he got the drugs and if he has been a
reliable drug dealer in the past. It is hoped that the court did not
mean that in North Dakota selling drugs three times is taken as the
test of veracity for fourth amendment purposes. In other words, the
reliable drug dealer should not be equated with the truthful police
informant.
20. 308 N.W.2d at 547.
21. Most pertinent, although suspect as a matter of precedent, is the declaration against interest
theory adopted by a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United States, 403
U.S. 573 (1971). The point here, however, is not whether better arguments might have been offered,
but rather their absence from the opinion and the imprudence of suggesting that a drug dealer can be
a credible person.
The affidavit offered to the magistrate in support of the warrant informed him of only one prior
sale, on the day before the Nagel episode. Appellant's Appendix at 2. Also, Agent Murphy testified at
the suppression hearing about only one purchase. Transcript on Appeal at 14. In contrast, the
affidavit offered to the district court at the suppression hearing vaguely describes two prior deliveries
to drug agents. Neither the State's attorney's trial brief, the district court's memorandum opinion
that repeated the State's narration of the facts, nor the North Dakota Supreme Court's opinion
seems to notice the discrepancy. Although the affidavit in support of the search warrant is full of
information about Agent Murphy's experience, and of course he is presumed credible, there is
nothing to support Murphy's belief that Braaten was telling the truth about Nagel and Gary and the
drugs at their residence, except for elaborate detail about the surveillance team's confirmation that
Braaten had been at the residence earlier and was seen leaving "with what appeared to be a package
in his hand." Appellant's Appendix at 2.
Only a cynic would suggest that the court was primarily impressed with the additional
information in the later affidavit, which indicated that tests on the substance sold by Braaten to
Murphy showed that it truly was the controlled substance promised. Moreover, although all
information known by the surveillance team need not be put in the affidavit to support the search
warrant, it may still justify the reasonable belief in the necessity for the entry and arrest. But that
distinction requires careful analysis of the record rather than the court's casual conclusion that there
was probable cause to support the search warrant. That conclusion suggests that the court was not
concerned with the distinction.
22. That the North Dakota Supreme Court is capable of more careful analysis of probable cause
issues is convincingly demonstrated by its painstaking opinion in State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401
(N.D. 1979). In Schmeets the court clearly discussed and distinguished the separate issues of the
credibility of the informant and the basis of his information. Id. at 406-10. But see State v.
Klosterman, 317 N.W. 2d 796 (N.D. 1982) (confusing analysis of the probable cause issue).
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III. RETROACTIVITY OF PAYTON v. NEW YORK
Assuming for the sake of argument that the North Dakota
Supreme Court correctly determined the issue of probable cause, it
could have disposed of the case based on its view that Payton should
not be applied retroactively. The court's analysis of the relevant
factors, quoted from Brown v. Louisiana,13 appears sound. The
inquiry focused on the purpose of the new rule, the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old rule, and the effect that
retroactive application of the new rule would have on the
administration of justice. The court noted that the privacy interest
intended to be protected by the warrant requirement of Payton could
not be retroactively restored to the defendants. 24 Also, the arresting
officers were relying in good faith upon a state statute authorizing
their warrantless entry and arrest and could not reasonably have
been expected to anticipate the Payton ruling.25
The court faltered somewhat in its reasoning when it
concluded that retroactive application would be extremely
burdensome to the administration of justice. It referred to cases
involving the broader issue of retroactive application of the
exclusionary rule itself, 26 which obviously has a greater impact than
the occasional warrantless entry to make an arrest in North
Dakota. The court correctly noted that subsequent fourth
amendment decisions have not been applied fully retroactively, and
thus concluded:
In this case, Monte and Gary were searched in
November, 1979. Payton v. New York was decided on April
15, 1980. Therefore, as we have determined that Payton
should not be applied retrospectively, and the search
complained of took place before the decision in Payton, the
entry and arrest pursuant to Section 29-06-14 was not
illegal at the time it took place and thus the search
warrant was not tainted by any unconstitutional
conduct.
27
23. 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
24. 308 N.W.2d at 545.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court cited Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965), as support for this proposition. 308 N.W.2d at 545.
27. 308 N.W.2d at 545. More perplexing is the following statement by the court: "The fact that
the defendants have not been convicted is inconsequential, the time ofapplication of a new doctrine is on the day after it
is decided. Williams v. United States supra, 401 U.S. at 654-60, 91 S.Ct. at 1153-56." 308 N.W.2d at 545
(emphasis in original).
This passage raises several interesting points. First, it is not to be found on the cited pages of
Williams v. United States. A citation oversight is neither unusual nor important, but presumably the
italics are intended to show the court's strength of conviction in the statement. The cited pages are in
fact part of Justice White's plurality opinion, announcing the Court's refusal to apply Chimel v.
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The United States Supreme Court recently held in United States
v. Johnson2 8 that decisions construing the fourth amendment are
applicable retroactively to all convictions then pending on direct
appeal. Neither the North Dakota Supreme Court nor this author
could reasonably have anticipated that new approach to fourth
amendment retroactivity. In essence, the United States Supreme
Court went back to the source of fourth amendment retroactivity
doctrine, Linkletter v. Walker,2 9 and adopted Justice Harlan's later
suggestion "that Linkletter was right in insisting that all 'new' rules
of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those
cases which are still subject to direct review by this Court at the
time the 'new' decision is handed down.' '30 This is not a proper
place to sort out the almost bitter controversy between the majority
and the dissent in Johnson, a five-four decision. The point is that the
North Dakota court's approach in Nagel was reasonable since, as
the dissent in Johnson concludes "we [the United States Supreme
Court] already had a perfectly good rule for resolving retroactivity
problems involving the Fourth Amendment."'" Whether the rule
was "perfectly good," it was the rule, and by applying it without
foreknowledge of the change in direction signalled by Johnson, the
North Dakota Supreme Court could have avoided much of its
troubling analysis of other issues in Nagel.
It is not the North Dakota court's conclusion or reasoning
that causes concern on this issue. Instead, as discussed earlier, it is
the placement of the issue in the opinion. Assuming the court is
correct, and means what it says on this issue, there is no reason to
proceed further. If the arrest was legal under the prior standard and
the statute authorizing warrantless entries to arrest, then there is no
need for the court's preceeding discussion of an exception to the
warrant requirement.
IV. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Payton v. New York32 held that the fourth amendment requires
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), retroactively. Does the North Dakota court intend to suggest that it
will follow a hard and fast rule that if Payton had been decided the day before the entry and arrest in
this case, its retroactivity decision would be different?
More pertinent to this comment, however, is a comparison of the Nagel opinion's structure and
discussion of unnecessary issues with Justice White's response to the prosecution's claim in Williams
that exigent circumstances existed that justified the warrantless search. He observed, in a footnote,
that "[b]ecause of our resolution of the retroactivity question, we find it unnecessary to pass on this
contention." Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 651 n.2 (1971).
28. 102 S. Ct. 2579(1982).
29. 381 U.S. 618(1965).
30. United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2586 (1982) (quoting Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2579 (White,J., dissenting).
32. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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the police to secure a valid arrest warrant before entering a perscn's
home to arrest him. The United States Supreme Court in Payton,
however, avoided as unnecessary any discussion of the "sort of
emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as
'exigent circumstances,' ",33 that might justify a warrantless entry
to arrest or search. The North Dakota Supreme Court in State v.
Page3 4 anticipated the possibility that a warrant might be required
to enter a person's home to effect an arrest and adopted guidelines
from Dorman v. United States,35 which purport to aid in the
determination that exigent circumstances exist. The guidelines that
justify a warrantless entry read as follows:
(1) A grievous offense is involved, particularly one
that is a crime of violence;
(2) The suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) There exists a clear showing of probable cause;
(4) There is a strong reason to believe that the sus-
pect is in the premises being entered;
(5) There is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if
not swiftly apprehended; and
(6) The unconsented entry is peaceably made. 36
In Page the North Dakota court added a caveat that the guidelines
should not be interpreted as cardinal maxims, nor rigidly applied to
every case. Instead, they were intended as flexible guidelines to
determine the lawfulness of warrantless entries. Even more
pointedly, the court added that they were not to be viewed as
conditions precedent to a lawful entry. 37
The trial court found that three of the six guidelines were not
satisfied in Nagel: no crime of violence or grievous offense was
involved; the police entertained no reasonable belief that
defendants were armed; and the entry was not peaceably made
because the door was forced open. 38 The North Dakota Supreme
Court read the district court opinion as requiring that all the
guidelines be met, and thus found error in treating the guidelines as
prerequisites to a lawful arrest and a finding of exigency. 39 It is
33. Id. at 583.
34. 277 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1979).
35. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
36. 277 N.W.2d at 118; Nagel, 308 N.W.2d at 542 n.2.
37. 277 N.W.2d at 118.
38. State v. Nagel, No. CR-80-20, slip op. at 7 (Cass County Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 1980). The
district court recognized that although sale or possession of drugs is serious, it doesn't approach a
matter of life and death. Id.
39. 308 N.W.2d at 542.
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difficult to understand how the trial court's finding that only half
the guidelines were satisfied can be translated to mean that all the
guidelines had to be met.
Also questionable is the apparent agreement of the North
Dakota Supreme Court and the district court that the State ad-
equately showed a likelihood that the suspects would escape if not
swiftly apprehended. The police expressed primary concern with
the destruction of evidence, not flight, although flight might be a
prelude to destruction. There is no suggestion that the surveillance
team was inadequate to apprehend Nagel and Gary had they tried
to escape while the officers waited outside until Agent Murphy
arrived with the search warrant.
Thus, it is arguable that only two of the guidelines were met:
the showing, in the court's view, of clear probable cause 40 and a
strong reason to believe that the suspects were in the premises being
entered. 1 Of course, without probable cause there is no need to
consider the warrant requirement; the entry would be unlawful
with or without a warrant. Also, if the officers did not strongly
believe that the suspects (and in Nagel, the evidence) were in the
premises entered, why would they bother to enter? Thus, the two
Page-Dorman guidelines satisfied in this case hardly seem
comparable in significance to those not met since they only reiterate
the minimum prerequisites to a legal and logical justification for
entering. Without more, then, the exceptional situation would
become the rule. The district court in recognizing that may hardly
be criticized fairly as requiring too rigid a prerequisite satisfaction
of all the guidelines.
But of course the district court could not have anticipated just
how flexible the guidelines would become. In Nagel the court added
a new guideline, presumably as an independently viable
justification for a warrantless entry. Now the list of legitimate
reasons for warrantless entries to arrest includes the prevention of
destruction of evidence.
42
The addition of a new category to enhance the flexibility of the
Page-Dorman guidelines is not without precedent4 3 nor is it
40. The court does not indicate how a clear showing of probable cause is to be distinguished
from the garden variety probable cause required in all other cases, nor does it explain why the
probable cause thought to exist here approaches that ineffable level of clarity.
41. A strong reason to believe, like a clear showing of probable cause, is not distinguished by the
court from a weak or mere reason to believe, which presumably would not satisfy the "not to be
rigidly applied" guideline.
42. 308 N.W.2d at 543-44.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Eddy, 660 F.2d 381, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978).
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necessarily bad. 4 The court, however, also had to overcome the
problem it had created for itself in State v. Matthews.45 Matthews held
that exigent circumstances as an exception to the warrant
requirement for searches is not an independent doctrinal category,
but rather is a shorthand description for the generally recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
46
Matthews, the court now tells us, is no barrier to applying an
exigent circumstances rationale in Nagel because Matthews dealt
with a search, not an arrest, and Page explicitly recognized a
difference.4 7 But the court never explains why an entry to search
and an entry to prevent the destruction of evidence by means of an
arrest are different for purposes of the fourth amendment and the
warrant requirement. Merely telling us they are different provides
a conclusion without a rationale.
It is difficult to imagine any good reason to distinguish the
arrest situation from the search situation, except to avoid the result
otherwise dictated by Matthews. After all, an entry into a home to
make an arrest is a search for and a seizure of a person. Arrests as
seizures of the person have been dealt with somewhat differently
from other seizures, as is shown by United States v. Watson.48 But
Payton shows a strong preference for some sort of warrant whenever
a home is entered. 49 A more recent decision, Steagald v. United
States,50 shows the United States Supreme Court's continued
preference for warrants in the context of entries into homes. A
more helpful analysis by the North Dakota Supreme Court would
openly accept and attempt to justify the general notion of an
emergency or exigent circumstance exception to the warrant
requirement and would overtly and self-consciously balance away
the privacy interests in individual cases by detailing the strong
44. No less an authority than Professor Wayne LaFave has recently cited Dorman as his favorite
example of a case that appears to draw bright lines that are incapable of application by police officers
in the field. Regarding Dorman's seven factors, Professor LaFave doubts "whether there is a police
officer in the country who would bet his lunch money on his ability to apply those seven factors
correctly in a particular case." LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith, " 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 322 (1982). Although the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Page did not purport to be drawing any bright lines or categorical rules, it
nonetheless seems preferable to avoid the guidelines altogether and focus on the exigencies of the
particular case. The clear rule is the warrant requirement. The guidelines, although intended to help
determine the exceptional situations in which the warrant rule is inapplicable, present the police,
criminal lawyers, and trial judges with an illusory promise of predictability and certainty.
45. 216 N.W.2d 90, 102 (N.D. 1974).
46. State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 100 (N.D. 1974).
47. 308 N.W.2d at 543.
48. 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (approving felony arrests without warrants, reserving the question of
home entries to accomplish the arrest).
49. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court seemed to disavow the
North Dakota court's distinction. Id. at 589-90.
50. 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (search warrant required to enter a person's home to arrest someone
else).
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policies necessitating the entry. 51
In any event, Nagel creates a new category of exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless entry to make an arrest to
preserve not the custody of the arrestee, but the evidence to be
searched for and seized. Having elucidated the underpinnings and
problems with the court's analysis in Nagel, this comment will now
focus briefly on the newly created category of exigency in the
context of the facts in Nagel.
First, the information giving rise to the exigency comes from
the informer and, thus, is no more credible than he. Second, there
is sparse evidence in the Nagel record to support the inference that
the large and presumably very valuable cache of drugs in the home
would have been destroyed by the people in the house. The officers
hoped to make a very large bust of the suppliers based on the
information from Braaten, the retailer. Presumably, then, the large
cache of drugs still in the home would be worth substantially more
than the $10,200 involved in the buy from Braaten. It is difficult to
support the surveillance team's inference that drugs worth tens of
thousands of dollars would be destroyed on the drug-pushing
informant's statement that if he did not return to the house in
twenty minutes the suppliers "would know something had gone
wrong. "152
It is more likely that the drug suppliers would try to flee,
probably with the drugs, if they were sufficiently worried about
what had gone wrong. Without evidence to the contrary, it must be
assumed that the team of officers could have safely and easily
arrested them as they left the building.5 3 Reasonable people can
disagree about the probabilities, and the court is properly
concerned with the practical necessities of law enforcement officers
making quick judgments in the field. No exigency, however,
explains the court's own conclusory reasoning.54
51. Mr. Quick's companion article is a healthy step in that direction.
52. 308 N.W.2d at 540.
53. Certainly a court that takes judicial notice of the common knowledge or fact that drugs may
be easily disposed of, State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (N.D. 1982); State v. Loucks, 209
N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973), could also recognize that forcible entries are dangerous to all
parties concerned. Thus, on the facts in Nagel, the entry was at best no less dangerous, in terms of
assuring the arrests (as opposed to the seizures of evidence), than waiting outside.
54. Cf State v. Miller, 190 Or. App. 604, 528 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Ct. App. 1974) (one of four
enumerated facts that gave the police sufficient knowledge of exigency was that the quantity of drugs
suspected was small in size and easily disposed of). Had the entry in Nagel occurred a few months
later, after January 1, 1980, the court would have had the opportunity to consider amended rule
41(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41(c) provides for the issuance of
warrants upon remote or telephonic communication. N.D.R. CRIM. P. 41(c). Federal courts have
made it clear that the potential for saving time by the use of a telephonic warrant is a critical factor in
the assessment of the degree of exigency in a warrantless entry. United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d
1139, 1146-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (S.D. Iowa
1981).
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In any event, the most telling defect in the court's uncritical
assumption of exigency is its subsequent determination that any
defect in the procedure employed is offset by the inevitable
discovery doctrine. The existence of an exigency requiring
immediate action to prevent the destruction of evidence appears
inconsistent with the conclusion that the subsequent search
conducted pursuant to the warrant would have inevitably resulted
in discovery of the drugs. The court, with its compartmentalized
discussions, does not appear to recognize the contradiction, much
less explain it. 15
V. INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
Assuming a constitutional violation, a sufficient connection
must exist between the illegality and the evidence seized and sought
to be suppressed before the exclusionary remedy is appropriate.
When the evidence is insufficiently connected to the illegality, the
metaphor of the United States Supreme Court is that the evidence
is not "fruit of the poisonous tree," and thus need not be
excluded. 56 Evidence can be found not to be the product of illegality
in several ways.
First, if it has been found independently of the illegality, it has
an independent source and thus is not "tainted." ' 57 Another
method of determining evidence to be unpoisoned by police
illegality is to adjudge the connection between the police illegality
and the subsequent acquisition of the evidence sufficiently removed
in time or place so that the "taint" of the initial illegality becomes
attenuated or purged. 58 In either event, the exclusionary rule does
not bar admission of the evidence.
Another possibility, in theory a variation of the independent
source rule, is the so-called "inevitable legitimate discovery"
doctrine. 59 A more accurate label, since the discovery is seldom
inevitable but rather involves varying degrees of speculative
certainty, is the "hypothetical independent source rule.' '60
Application of the inevitable discovery notion generally follows a
typical pattern. The police obtain evidence through a fourth
55. This point, dealing with the apparent inconsistency between the court's discussion of
exigency and inevitable discovery, is taken up again in the context of examining the court's
misapplication of the inevitable discovery doctrine. See infra pp. 741-42.
56. E.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
57. Id.; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
58. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
59. See Note, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483 (1976); Note, The Inevitable
Discovery Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88 (1974).
60. Following common usage, also adopted by the court in Nagel, 308 N.W.2d at 545, the name
will be shortened to the inevitable discovery doctrine.
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amendment illegality. A court is legitimately concerned with the
unfortunate effect of excluding probative evidence merely because
of the way in which it was seized. A creative prosecutor convinces
the court that, absent the unfortunate illegal search, the highly
efficient law enforcement team would have found the evidence
through other, legal investigative procedures. In other words, but
for the unfortunate intervening illegality, the evidence would have
been found legally. Thus, the court is asked to hypothesize an
independent source.
There are serious problems with the concept, not the least of
which is its utility as merely another uncritical device for avoiding
the feared, harmful effects of application of the exclusionary rule.
6
1
The North Dakota Supreme Court resisted adoption of the
inevitable discovery doctrine until very recently. As late as two
years ago, in In re M.D.]., 62 the court avoided the bold step of
hypothesizing an independent source for illegally obtained
evidence. In State v. Phelps,63 however, the court cautiously adopted
the doctrine and expressed concern that it might become another
exclusion that could consume the exclusionary rule. 64 To avoid that
effect the court turned to Professor Wayne LaFave for limits on the
doctrine and promised to allow introduction of illegally seized
evidence only when the police have not acted in bad faith to speed
the discovery of the evidence and the evidence "would," not
"might," have been discovered anyway. 65
LaFave's limits are, in theory, conceptual checks on a doctrine
that would undercut completely the policies of the exclusionary rule
if expanded to its full potential. The North Dakota Supreme
Court's experience with the limits, however, shows that attempts to
apply the limits prove them virtually incapable of principled use.
What were set out as intended meaningful limits on the doctrine in
Phelps, and were applied in State v. Johnson, 66 have now, in Nagel,
disappeared from mention or application altogether. 67 In Nagel
61. The North Dakota Supreme Court's distaste for the exclusionary rule is an attribute it can
no longer keep to itself. See State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185, 190-91 (N.D. 1981) (strong
language indicating dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule and reluctant admission that it must, as
a matter of federal law, abide by the rule); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 627 (N.D. 1981)
(same). To judge whether that distaste has affected the nature of the court's fourth amendment
decisions, see the erosion of the exclusionary rule in the court's string of inevitable discovery opinions
discussed infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text and, for an even clearer example, see the harmless
error ruling in State v. Wetsch, 304 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1981).
62. 285 N.W. 2d 558 (N.D. 1979).
63. 297 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1980).
64. State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (N.D. 1980).
65. Id. at 775. See also 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4 (1978).
66. 301 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (N.D. 1981).
67. In State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1981), decided betweenjohnson and Nagel,
inevitable discovery is invoked twice. Id. at 193, 194. First, a citation to Phelps is followed by the
observation that the alleged illegality at worst "merely accelerated the investigation and inevitable
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there is merely a statement, accompanied by a footnote to LaFave's
treatise, that careless application of the doctrine will encourage
unconstitutional shortcuts.
68
A discussion of Nagel, however, is not the place to elaborate on
the difficulties with the doctrine of inevitable discovery for one
simple reason: Nagel is not an inevitable discovery case. As the
court interprets the record, the marijuana and methamphetamines
in question were discovered in the search under the warrant, not
during the entry and arrest challenged by the defendants. Thus, the
productive legal search and seizure were neither hypothetical nor
inevitable - they were actual. The real question is whether the
challenged entry and arrest, if they were illegal, tainted the
subsequent search under the warrant. Stated another way, the issue
is whether a warrant can purge the taint of an earlier illegality when
the warrant is issued independently of any information obtained in
the initial entry and arrest.
69
Indeed, the primary case relied on by the court in its inevitable
discovery analysis, Cruse v. State,70 is pitched in the language of
independent source and purging of the taint. Its language is very
close to that of Nagel: "Where the disputed evidence stems from an
independent and lawful source, even though it could have emerged
from the prior unlawful search as well, the evidence is admis-
sible. '71
The inapplicability of the inevitable discovery analysis is
obvious when juxtaposed with the court's justification for the
exigent entry. The officers were justified in entering because of
their probable cause belief that the evidence would either disappear
discovery." Id. at 193. No mention is made of the good faith and speeding discovery components of
LaFave's first limit, thus it is impossible to determine why the officer's faith and timing in Klevgaard
were appropriate when the officer in Johnson was not given the same consideration. The second
invocation of inevitable discovery in Klevgaard merely cites Phelps without any indication or
application of the limits to the doctrine. Id. at 194.
68. 308 N.W.2d at 546, 546 n.5 (citing 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE S 11.4(a), at 623-24
(1978)). In its latest encounter with the inevitable discovery situation the court again avoids the
exclusionary rule and the problem of an alleged constitutional violation of the fifth amendment by
noting that "the gun nevertheless was properly seized pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine.
See State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1980)." State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 787 (N.D.
1982). If the court is truly concerned with the potential for erosion of constitutional rights that it
occasionally mentions, it should provide an explanation in each case of how the prosecution has met
its burden of proving that the evidence would have been found, the rule adopted in Phelps. In Sk jonsby
the court said that the officers "could" have found the car containing the gun, id., therefore the
North Dakota Supreme Court apparently has equated "could" with "would." The court should
also provide an explanation in each case of how the prosecution has met its burden of proving that
the officers were not acting in bad faith to accelerate discovery of the evidence, the second rule
adopted in Phelps.
69. United States v. Beck, 662 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1981), involves a factual situation similar to
Nagel. In Beck the Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary, to determine the merits of the prosecution's
claim of exigent circumstances because the evidence was found in the subsequent search pursuant to
a warrant. For further discussion of Beck, see infra note 78.
70. 584 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1978).
71. Cruse v. State, 584 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Alaska 1978).
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with the fleeing occupants or be destroyed by them. However, if
they were wrong or their actions were somehow found to be illegal,
the court tells us it does not matter because the drugs would have
been found later by Agent Murphy when he executed the warrant.
Thus, law enforcement officers may rely on exigent circumstances
if they believe the evidence will disappear. But if they are in error,
it does not matter because the court believes that the same evidence
that was in imminent danger of destruction would also inevitably
be found two hours later when the warrant was executed.
Apparently, the police can do no wrong in a situation such as this.
The court's unnecessary discussion of inevitable discovery
results in a failure to discuss meaningfully the fruit of the poisonous
tree issue. The court does tell us that Agent Murphy's warrant is
pure because he knew nothing about the marijuana found by the
officers when they entered the home. That may well be, although
one may question the believability of such a one-way conversation
between members of a law enforcement team. The issue, assuming
the purity of the information, is whether the seizure is independent
of the prior illegality or, if not, whether the warrant purges the
initial police action of its illegality. 72 The Cruse case, relied on by
the North Dakota court, supports that approach. In addition, the
United States Supreme Court in Wong Sun tells us that not "all
evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police." ' 73
Application of the exclusionary rule in Nagel might seem
particularly illogical since the officers making the initial entry were
relying in good faith upon a state statute not yet determined to be
unconstitutional. Also, they entered the home to make effective a
subsequent search that was conducted under a warrant which was
already in process at the time of their entry.
More appropriate, perhaps, would have been a discussion of
what Professor LaFave calls "the impoundment alternative." 74 He
suggests attention to the "question whether there is a way to deal
with the loss-of-evidence risk which does not necessitate, on the one
hand, warrantless searches or, on the other, arrest of all those
present. ' 75 Assuming the existence of probable cause and a need
72. 'Although the logic of the proposition is not stated, apparently at least four Justices of the
United States Supreme Court believe that a warrant can attenuate the taint of prior illegality because
of the insertion of a magistrate into the process. Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978)
(equally divided Court, affirming per curiam and without opinion); see also Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (lineup conducted while appellant was detained pursuant to a magistrate's
commitment was purged of taint of challenged arrest).
73. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
74. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 6.5, at 450 (1978).
75. Id.
STATE V. NAGEL
for the warrantless home entry, the arrests in Nagel are justifiable.
Taking the facts as the court views them and assuming that no
information passed from the surveillance team agents at the scene
to Agent Murphy and through him to the magistrate, it seems that
the practical effect of and the justification for the method and
timing of the arrests is as an impoundment prior to a warranted
search. Although the pure impoundment question is, according to
LaFave, still virtually an unknown quantity,76 an impoundment in
Nagel arguably would present only a slight incremental privacy
invasion since the initial entry and arrest were undertaken in good
faith under the authority of a presumptively valid state statute.
All this, however, merely restates the issues discussed in the
context of avoiding Payton in this case, either by holding it to be
nonretroactive or by finding a justified deviation from its warrant
requirement. If either of those grounds is valid, the fruits, taint,
purge, and inevitable discovery issues are superfluous-the
evidence seized was simply not the result of any illegality.
If the entry and the initial arrests are illegal, it is difficult to see
how they could be held to be independent of the later search and
seizure pursuant to the warrant since the court had already
indicated that they were necessary to the successful later seizure.
77
Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the warrant and the two
hour wait could somehow purge the taint of the prior illegality. 78
As previously discussed, the police can do no wrong under the
court's rationale. The court's inevitable discovery argument is
based and relies on the mirror image of that discussion, on a feeling
that the defendants should not be able to have it both ways either. If
as the defendants claimed and the trial court believed there was no
adequate exigency, the question is whether the defendants should
be bound by their claim that the evidence would have been there
and thus would have been discovered "inevitably" and
"independently" by the officers executing the warrant. The
answer is based on the elementary logic of the fourth amendment.
There are only two possible states of affairs: either there was a
need for the entry and arrest or there was not. If the court's version
of the paradox is adopted, the result is that the police cannot lose.
76. Id. at 451.
77. 308 N.W.2d at 544.
78. But see United States v. Beck, 662 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1981). In Beck, which involved facts
similar to those in Nagel, the court of appeals ignored the question of exigency by finding the
subsequent search pursuant to a warrant to be independent. However, the court's holding that the
search and the seizure pursuant to the warrant were independent of the prior entry and arrests is
explained on the basis of the fact that the magistrate's probable cause finding was not based upon
information obtained as a result of the earlier alleged illegality. Id. at 530. Unexplained is the factual
connection between the earlier police activity, claimed to be required by exigency, and the success of
the subsequent search.
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The result in Nagel frees the police to enter and arrest in any
situation in which they have an officer en route to obtain a warrant,
irrespective of the correctness of their judgment. Police officers,
being only human, cannot be motivated to make judgments in
situations in which their judgment is irrelevant. Thus, the court's
approach in Nagel is inconsistent with the fourth amendment's
requirement that the police obtain a warrant before entering a
home to search or arrest because it removes the practical necessity
for any judgment whatsoever about the legality of the entry prior to
the execution of the search warrant.
Even officers acting in good faith will make mistakes. Nagel,
however, removes the incentive for making any judgment because
the evidence will be admissible as long as the probable cause is
correctly communicated to the magistrate and the warrant is
properly executed. A decision resulting in a rule that the police can
do no wrong when they enter and arrest so long as a subsequent
search warrant results in the actual search for and seizure of the
evidence is inconsistent with a healthy fourth amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although this discussion of the North Dakota Supreme
Court's decision in Nagel has been critical, it should be clear that
the concern is not so much with the court's reversal of the trial
court's suppression as it is with the method used to justify that
result. Ready answers to the difficult questions posed by Nagel
cannot be offered, but more careful attention to the process used in
supporting the court's decisions is suggested. In summary, the
Nagel opinion demonstrates that the court could better fulfill its
mission of explaining and applying the law by avoiding
unnecessary discussion of difficult issues 79 and by offering well-
developed discussion of the critical issues.
80
79. Because of its finding that Payton is nonretroactive, the court could have avoided discussing
the exigent circumstances issue. See supra p. 734. Inevitable discovery is not really an issue, but is
discussed by the court at length. See supra pp. 739-44.
80. The court dealt with probable cause, a central issue, in very conclusory terms. See supra notes
18-22 and accompanying text. The issues of fruit of the poisonous tree and dissipation of taint are
barely noticed. See supra pp. 739-44.
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